PropertyValue
?:abstract
  • Abstract Imagine you are an agnostic who wants to maximise your chances of getting the right answer to the question whether God exists. I show that theism and atheism are not on an epistemic par with one another because, under certain possible epistemically neutral conditions, the rational thing for you to do from a purely epistemic point of view would be to bet on the atheist’s judgement that God doesn’t exist rather than on the theist’s judgement that God does exist.
is ?:annotates of
?:creator
?:doi
?:doi
  • 10.1007/s11406-020-00295-2
?:journal
  • Philosophia_(Ramat_Gan)
?:license
  • cc-by
?:pdf_json_files
  • document_parses/pdf_json/931a8bab6d1e78c025bbb905b8980490b24004ca.json
?:pmc_json_files
  • document_parses/pmc_json/PMC7682767.xml.json
?:pmcid
?:pmid
?:pmid
  • 33250541.0
?:publication_isRelatedTo_Disease
?:sha_id
?:source
  • Medline; PMC
?:title
  • God and the Girl
?:type
?:year
  • 2020-11-23

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