PropertyValue
?:abstract
  • In his important paper “Just Better Utilitarianism,” Matti Häyry reminds his readers that liberal utilitarianism can offer a basis for moral and political choices in bioethics and thus could be helpful in decisionmaking.(1) Although I agree with the general defense of Häyry’s liberal utilitarianism, in this commentary, I urge Häyry to say more on who belongs to our moral community. I challenge Häyry’s principle of actual or prospective existence. I also argue that Häyry should say more on human beings at the “margin of life” (such as fetuses and other mindless humans). I claim that debate over whether some form of utilitarianism is superior over other moral theories is not as important as answering the question underlying these issues: Who belongs to our moral community?
is ?:annotates of
?:creator
?:doi
  • 10.1017/s0963180120000894
?:doi
?:journal
  • Cambridge_quarterly_of_healthcare_ethics_:_CQ_:_the_international_journal_of_healthcare_ethics_committees
?:license
  • cc-by
?:pdf_json_files
  • document_parses/pdf_json/b85aa387e6d1f7e8412117326649c8c1dd479314.json
?:pmcid
?:pmid
?:pmid
  • 33032664.0
?:publication_isRelatedTo_Disease
?:sha_id
?:source
  • Medline; PMC
?:title
  • Liberal Utilitarianism—Yes, But for Whom?
?:type
?:year
  • 2020-10-09

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