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Early vaccination of the general population is a very crucial aspect in the successful mitigation of highly infectious diseases, as it is the case of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The perception of possible side-effects from early batches of vaccines, presumably under-tested, is often a hindering factor for people not in high-risk categories to opt-in for early vaccination. In this work, early vaccination is formulated under a game-theoretic view with preference ranking and expectation maximization, in order to explore the constraints and conditions under which individuals are keen to opt-in for getting vaccinated. Although simple preference ranking leads to purely non-cooperative / non-altruistic Nash equilibrium, stable cooperative strategies can emerge under simple constraints on the payoffs, specifically the individual cost from possible side-effects versus the collective gain for the community (`herd\') when endorsing vaccination by default.
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?:doi
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?:doi
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10.1101/2020.11.25.20238725
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document_parses/pdf_json/42dbd34ce256ecda7bac8b46e18ea4024cd9e4f2.json
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Social responsibility is the crucial factor in adopting early vaccination plans
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