PropertyValue
?:abstract
  • In this paper, we explore three separate questions that are relevant to assessing the prudential value of life in infants with severe life-limiting illness. First, what is the value or disvalue of a short life? Is it in the interests of a child to save her life if she will nevertheless die in infancy or very early childhood? Second, how does profound cognitive impairment affect the balance of positives and negatives in a child’s future life? Third, if the life of a child with life-limiting illness is prolonged, how much suffering will she experience and can any of it be alleviated? Is there a risk that negative experiences for such a child (suffering) will remain despite the provision of palliative care? We argue that both the subjective and objective components of well-being for children could be greatly reduced if they are anticipated to have a short life that is affected by profound cognitive impairment. This does not mean that their overall well-being will be negative, but rather that there may be a higher risk of negative overall well-being if they are expected to experience pain, discomfort, or distress. Furthermore, we point to some of the practical limitations of therapies aimed at relieving suffering, such that there is a risk that suffering will go partially or completely unrelieved. Taken together, these considerations imply that some life-prolonging treatments are not in the best interests of infants with severe life-limiting illness.
is ?:annotates of
?:creator
?:doi
?:doi
  • 10.1007/s11017-020-09532-x
?:externalLink
?:journal
  • Theor_Med_Bioeth
?:license
  • cc-by
?:pdf_json_files
  • document_parses/pdf_json/f211ff851343983b410540631339dc4b6f26fa2a.json
?:pmc_json_files
  • document_parses/pmc_json/PMC7745707.xml.json
?:pmcid
?:pmid
?:pmid
  • 33331998
?:publication_isRelatedTo_Disease
?:sha_id
?:source
  • PMC
?:title
  • Valuing life and evaluating suffering in infants with life-limiting illness
?:type
?:year
  • 2020-12-17

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