PropertyValue
?:abstract
  • Would the affected communities voluntarily obtain herd immunity if a cure for COVID-19 was available? This paper experimentally investigates people’s vaccination choices in the context of a nonlinear public good game. A “vaccination game” is defined in which costly commitments (vaccination) are required of a fraction of the population to reach the critical level needed for herd immunity, without which defectors are punished by the natural contagion of epidemics. Our experimental implementation of a vaccination game in a controlled laboratory setting reveals that endogenous epidemic punishment is a credible threat, resulting in voluntary vaccination to obtain herd immunity, for which the orthodox principle of positive externalities fails to account. The concave nature of the infection probability plays a key role in facilitating the elimination of an epidemic.
?:creator
?:doi
  • 10.1371/journal.pone.0232652
?:doi
?:journal
  • PLoS_One
?:license
  • cc-by
?:pdf_json_files
  • document_parses/pdf_json/4176cadb9a1830950668ddb36760ea4e1540f2cd.json
?:pmc_json_files
  • document_parses/pmc_json/PMC7224512.xml.json
?:pmcid
?:pmid
?:pmid
  • 32407329.0
?:publication_isRelatedTo_Disease
?:sha_id
?:source
  • Medline; PMC
?:title
  • Herd immunity and a vaccination game: An experimental study
?:type
?:year
  • 2020-05-14

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